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THE VIRUS, RISK, AND COMMERCIAL
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES:
EXAMINING DODD-FRANK’S IMPACT IN THE
MIDST OF A PANDEMIC
Owen Haney*
ABSTRACT
When lawmakers sought to reshape the financial industry through
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, they specifically
attacked the “moral hazard” in the asset-backed securities market
that they believed was partly responsible for the collapse of global
financial markets. Congress identified several practices in assetbacked securitizations that posed a risk to the world economy. In
particular, regulators believed that the “originate-to-distribute”
model, whereby loan originators—those parties armed with the best
knowledge regarding the quality of the loans in the transaction and
who consequently set underwriting standards—could sell off the
loans without bearing any risk should those borrowers (homeowners
in the residential mortgage-backed securities space, and businesses
in the commercial mortgage-backed securities space) go into default.
With the adoption of risk-retention rules, lawmakers hoped that
originators would be incentivized to provide accurate information to
investors about the risk of securitized loans because they would now
be required to hold a swatch of the securities themselves. In addition
to requiring loan originators to keep some “skin in the game,” DoddFrank-era reforms increased disclosure requirements and altered the
weighting of mortgage-backed securities for the purposes of riskbased capital rules so as to make them more expensive to investors.
In early March 2020, nearly ten years after the passage of DoddFrank, the stock market plunged to historic lows once more. Over
the course of four days, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 26%.
*
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National unemployment suddenly rose to over 20%. Covid-19 had
arrived in the United States, and the national financial immune
system went into shock. Economic distress, unemployment, and
stay-at-home orders heavily damaged American businesses,
particularly brick-and-mortars. Commercial mortgages experienced
rapid default because underlying businesses could not afford to make
payments.
The corresponding commercial mortgage-backed securities industry
went into a tailspin, and observers were left with this unsettling
question: did Dodd-Frank do enough to eliminate the moral hazard
and dangerous practices that led to the last financial meltdown, or
would this exogenous viral shock expose wrongdoing capable of
once again systemically crippling the world economy?
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PART I: BACKGROUND
Since the first reported case of Covid-19 in the United States on
January 22, 2020,1 over 31 million people in the United States have been
infected by the virus, and over 559,000 individuals have died as a result
of the disease.2 In addition to the virus’s devastating impact on human
health, the economic consequences of the virus have been similarly
grim. Stay-at-home orders and other government restrictions shuttered
“non-essential” businesses.3 Stock prices fell precipitously in March.4
In April, unemployment in the country peaked at 14.7%.5 The United
States is experiencing its second recession of the 21st century.6
The focus of this note is the impact of coronavirus on commercial
mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) and whether the virus has
exposed systemic risk within the CMBS market. Moreover, this note
explores whether the regulation of CMBS following the reforms of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank” or simply “the Act”)7 have positioned the country to withstand
systemic risk embedded in the CMBS market, if it exists.

1. See Jennifer Harcourt et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
From Patient With Coronavirus Disease, United States, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1266, 1266, 1268 (2020).
2. These are the statistics in the United States as of April 9, 2021, according to the
New York Times. See Jordan Allen et al., Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and
Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2021, 7:41 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html [https://perma.cc/G2ME-WGTH].
3. See, e.g., Governor orders all non-essential workers in NY to stay home,
WHAM (Mar. 20, 2020), https://13wham.com/news/local/governor-orders-all-nonessential-workers-in-ny-to-stay-home [https://perma.cc/S5J9-4P3G].
4. See, e.g., Coronavirus: U.S. Stocks See Worst Fall Since 1987, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51903195 [https://perma.cc/
M6XH-E26H].
5. Paul Fronstin & Stephen A. Woodbury, How Many Americans Have Lost Jobs
With Employer Health Coverage During the Pandemic?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct.
3, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/oct/howmany-lost-jobs-employer-coverage-pandemic [https://perma.cc/8M4H-4WTJ].
6. Neil Irwin, The Pandemic Depression Is Over. The Pandemic Recession Has
Just Begun., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/upshot/
pandemic-economy-recession.html [https://perma.cc/FH5P-8VZG].
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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A. COMMERCIAL-MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES
A commercial mortgage-backed security is a debt instrument made
up of commercial mortgage loans that are secured by the first lien in the
underlying real estate.8 Unlike residential mortgage-backed securities
(“RMBS”), the underlying real estate in CMBS is income-producing and
managed for a business purpose.9 CMBS offers an alternative financing
vehicle—distinct from an ordinary commercial real estate loan—for
commercial properties such as hotels, malls, office buildings, and
apartment buildings.10
The first entity to securitize commercial mortgages in a structure
that resembled modern CMBS was the government sponsored
Resolution Trust Corporation in the early 1990s.11 Private CMBS
sprouted soon after, and issuance continued to grow until the market
collapsed in 2007.12 The CMBS market recovered after the crash in
2007, but new issuance in 2019 was still less than half of the $250
billion in new issuance in 2007.13 Since the risk-retention rule14 went
into effect in 2016, new issuance of CMBS has slowed once more.15
In an ordinary CMBS transaction, a loan originator places the
commercial loan into a trust—a bankruptcy-remote vehicle—which in
turn issues different classes of bonds, also known as tranches, which are

8. See Patrick Corcoran, A Property Market Framework for Bond Investors, in
THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 1, 1 (Frank J.
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997).
9. See Alice A. Lustig, The Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Market, in
THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 75, 75 (Frank J.
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997).
10. See Maegan E. O’Rourke, The New Normal: How the Dodd-Frank Risk
Retention Rules Affect the Future of CMBS, 51 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 77, 81—82
(2018).
11. See id. at 81.
12. See id.
13. See Jamie Woodwell & Reggie Booker, CMBS Spreads & Issuance, MORTG.
BANKERS ASS’N: COM./MULTIFAMILY MKT. INTEL. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://www.mba.org/news-research-and-resources/research-andeconomics/commercial/-multifamily-research/blog/blog-posts/current-blog-posts/cmbsspreads-and-issuance [https://perma.cc/YHG3-NC6X].
14. See infra Part II.
15. See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 89.
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backed by the interest and principle of the underlying mortgages.16
Banks participate in CMBS as originators, as investors, and as service
providers.17 CMBS are structured so that the highest class of
bondholders, such as the AAA-rated class, receives any return of
principle first, while bondholders of the BBB-rated tranche will be the
last to receive a return of principal.18 Despite the risk of the lowest rated
tranche, the “B-Piece” bondholder often contracts for special protections
and is often a sophisticated investor.19 When a CMBS becomes
delinquent, meaning that a loan becomes more than 60 days past due,
a special servicer is engaged to either extend the loan, make loan
modifications, restructure the loan, or foreclose and sell the property.20
Certain features of CMBS require special attention when
considering the risks posed by CMBS to investors. Generally, CMBS
deals consist of fewer loans than their RMBS counterparts.21 Thus, when
a loan in the pool of loans underlying the securities goes into default, it
may pose a greater risk of delinquency of the entire CMBS structure. 22
Moreover, CMBS deals often entail balloon loans, which require a
substantial principal payment at loan maturity.23 If a deal calls for full
payment of principal at maturity, delay results in balloon default. 24 As
a result, modern CMBS deals incorporate “external tail” provisions,
which set the maturity date of the CMBS issue after the maturity date
for the underlying loans.25 This allows the servicer time to arrange
refinancing and to advance interest and scheduled principal payments to
bondholders in the event of a loan default.26

16. See John N. Dunlevy, Structural Considerations Impacting CMBS, in THE
HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 123, 123 (Frank J.
Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997).
17. See Alan Kronovet & Chris van Heerden, Chapter 2 in the History of CMBS:
Coming to Terms with the New Rules, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 67, 71 (2016).
18. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 126.
19. O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 85.
20. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 129.
21. See O’Rourke, supra note 10, at 82.
22. See id.
23. See Dunlevy, supra note 16, at 126.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 127.
26. See id.
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B. CMBS AND THE CORONAVIRUS
The coronavirus pandemic has had a profound effect on the CMBS
market in the United States. Commercial properties have suffered as
a result of the recession:27 Businesses have largely transitioned to remote
work,28 and social-distancing mandates29 and stay-at-home orders have
reduced human interaction.30 The cumulative effect of these changes has
been the failure of over $5.5 billion in commercial mortgage loans
between the months of May and June 2020, or a surge of 792% for the
same period last year.31
Loan-level failures have traveled up the securitization pipeline
leading to concerning levels of delinquencies in the CMBS market.
In June 2020, the overall delinquency rate32 of loans comprised in
CMBS was 10.32%, just two basis points off the peak delinquency rate
for CMBS in 2012.33
The current crisis has produced a much swifter rise in CMBS
delinquencies than the last financial crisis (the “2007–08 Financial

27.
28.

See Irwin, supra note 6, at 6.
See Forbes Real Est. Council, 14 Big Factors Driving Commercial Real Estate
Trends This Year, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2020/09/08/14-big-factors-driving-commercial-real-estatetrends-this-year/?sh=75b6e63d7ee8 [https://perma.cc/468J-C36M].
29. See generally Koren Miklós & Rita Pető, Business Disruptions From Social
Distancing, 15 PLOS ONE 1 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239113
[https://perma.cc/3AHE-TMLM].
30. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Pandemic Risk Factors and the Role of Government
Intervention: Evidence From COVID-19 and CMBS Mortgage Performance
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3674960
[https://perma.cc/Q5EN-R59B].
31. See Dorothy Neufeld, Commercial Mortgage Delinquencies Near Record
Levels, VISUAL CAPITALIST (July 16, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/
mortgage-delinquencies [https://perma.cc/JZ4W-NDFU].
32. “The delinquency rate is defined as the percentage of commercial real estate
loans that were 30 or more days past due or in foreclosure. The higher the delinquency
rate, the more likely investors in these transactions will absorb credit losses.” NAIC
Cap. Mkts. Bureau, CMBS Market Showing Signs of Life Despite High Delinquency
Rate,
NAT’L
ASS’N
INS.
COMM’RS
(2018),
https://www.naic.org/
capital_markets_archive/110307.htm [https://perma.cc/S9B3-3ARS].
33. CMBS Delinquency Rate Continues Retreat From Near All-Time High, TREPP
(Sept.
1,
2020),
https://info.trepp.com/hubfs/Trepp%20August%202020%20CMBS%20Delinquency%2
0Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPS6-8J7P].
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Crisis” or “Financial Crisis”). As of June 2020, the pandemic’s
devastation in the CMBS market has equaled the disruption of the last
recession, doing so four years and eight months sooner.
Though the overall delinquency rate in CMBS has dropped from its
June 2020 peak,34 certain sectors of the CMBS market continue to
decay. CMBS backed by lodging reached a new high of 17.53%
delinquency in October, while CMBS backed by retail hit 11.33%
delinquency for the same month.35 Regional malls have been particularly
devastated; during October they experienced a delinquency rate of
21.06%.36 As coronavirus cases increased through the United States in
the “second wave” of the pandemic during the end of 2020,37 the CMBS
market may continue to deteriorate.38
C. SYSTEMIC RISK AND CMBS
The CMBS market is approaching a notable and dour benchmark:
delinquencies reached 10.32% in June 2020, just below the all-time
high-water mark of 10.34% set in July 2012.39 Despite the similarity of
these figures, the source of the crises vastly differ. The current crisis is
linked to the coronavirus: apartment owners, restaurants, and hotels are
unable to pay rent as a result of the virus, leaving insufficient cash flows
to cover mortgage payments and other debts.40 The last crisis, however,

34. New delinquencies were at 4.85% for the month of October 2020. See U.S.
CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase in October, FITCH RATINGS (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/us-cmbs-delinquenciesresume-increase-in-october-06-11-2020 [https://perma.cc/BV2H-4NKN].
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See Lisa Lockerd Maragakis, Coronavirus Second Wave? Why Cases Increase,
JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/
conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/first-and-second-waves-of-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/DZY4-Y3LX].
38. Fitch still predicts the overall delinquency rate to be less than its projection of
8.25% and 8.75% for the end of 2020. See U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Resume Increase
in October, supra note 34.
39. See Paul Bubny, CMBS Delinquencies Spike in June; Near 2012 Peak (July 6,
2020)
https://www.connectcre.com/stories/cmbs-delinquencies-spike-in-june-near2012-peak [https://perma.cc/3H2H-25K8].
40. See Peter J. Irwin et al., CMBS Loan Workouts During COVID-19: A
Borrower’s
Perspective, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON
(May
14,
2020),
https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/05/20200514cmbs-loan-workouts-during-covid-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/296R-T55P].
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began with a steep decline in value in the housing market, which sent
shockwaves through the rest of the economy.41 Though different sources
of disruption, they may both be primers for systemic risk.
Systemic risk might be quickly defined as the risk that disruption in
the financial system will cause the collapse of the real economy.42 As an
example of systemic risk in action, the 2007–08 Financial Crisis was
ultimately the product of erroneous market expectations.43 Investors,
rating agencies, and borrowers misapprehended the ability of
homeowners to maintain mortgage payments, and firms and lenders
found themselves overleveraged at both the institutional and loan level
when the housing market deteriorated in 2007.44 As residential
mortgages, particularly sub-prime mortgages, began to default, firms
that were heavily invested in RMBS began to incur steep losses.45 Out of
panic or uncertainty, the public and other firms retreated from
institutions associated with asset-backed securities, and soon, firm
liquidity and public credit evaporated.46 The recession swept in, and the
failure of market expectations precipitated the failure of the real
economy.
In the wake of the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, a wealth of literature
has spread discussing the role of banks,47 insurance companies,48 and the

41. See Ingrid Gould Ellen & Samuel Dastrup, Housing and the Great Recession,
FURMAN CTR. (Oct. 2012), https://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Housingandthe
GreatRecession.pdf [https://perma.cc/V22L-3R33].
42. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2019).
43. See Howell E. Jackson & Steven L. Schwarcz, Pandemics and Systemic
Financial Risk 5 (Apr. 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3580425 [https://perma.cc/R6YK-3BDQ].
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Rebecca Keats, U.S. Banks Played a Pivotal Role in the 2008
Financial Crisis, MKT. REALIST (Jan. 2016), https://marketrealist.com/2015/11/usbanks-played-pivotal-role-2008-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/MPK8-NSML].
48. See, e.g., Prudential Is Freed From “Too Big to Fail” Label and the Tough
Oversight
That
Came
With
It,
L.A.
TIMES
(Oct.
17,
2018),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-prudential-too-big-to-fail-20181017-story.html
[https://perma.cc/NKL5-UDB9].
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interdependence of markets in the creation of systemic risk.49 While the
literature generally agrees that systemic risk arises from any disturbance
that works itself through the economic system to an extent that
compromises the public’s confidence in the financial system and its
stability as a whole, scholars offer numerous methods of quantifying,
measuring, and insuring against systemic risk.50 These methods deserve
a student’s note worth of discussion all their own.
In short, systemic risk is tied to size. If a financial institution is
large enough, and if a financial market is massive enough, then the
failure of the institution or the market will result in the collapse of all
related institutions or markets.51 Though the securitization of sub-prime
residential mortgages is among the most commonly cited reasons behind
the 2007–08 Financial Crisis,52 Congress sought to eliminate other
issues in the CMBS markets which it perceived to have played a role in
the economy’s collapse.53 While Congress sought to curb these
behaviors, there is still no certainty whether the CMBS market, on its
own, contributes to systemic risk.54
During the period between 1998 and 2007, the CMBS market
rapidly expanded and CMBS became the dominant financing vehicle for
the commercial real estate industry.55 As the popularity of CMBS grew,
so too did its investor pool. Where B-Piece investors were once the
same pool of sophisticated risk-savvy investors,56 the subordinated
tranche of CMBS increasingly became the eye for investors in CDOs, or
collateralized debt obligations.57 These investors profited by purchasing,
packaging, and re-securitizing the first-loss B-Piece to its own pool of
investors.58 This “originate to securitize” model eliminated risk to

49. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: The Interconnection
Problem in Financial Markets and Financial Regulation, a European (Banking) Union
Perspective, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 271, 272 (2014).
50. See generally Cristina Georgiana Zeldea, Systemic Risk: An Overview, 2019
FIN. STUD. 35, 38–43 (2019).
51. See Joseph Haubrich & Charlotte DeKoning, Sizing Up Systemic Risk, 13
ECON. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2017).
52. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate
Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 84 (2013).
53. See infra Part II.
54. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 108.
55. See id. at 97.
56. Id. at 98.
57. See id. at 102.
58. Id.
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originators, while exposing a less sophisticated market participant to the
most risk-laden investment in CMBS.
As competition for subordinated and other classes of CMBS
securities increased, underwriting standards deteriorated.59 Debt-servicecoverage ratios (“DSCRs”) declined during this period, meaning that
mortgage cash flows were increasingly unable to cover the underlying
commercial collateral’s debt obligations.60 Studies of commercial real
estate associate a decline of DSCR ratio with defaults in mortgage
loans.61
Meanwhile, rating agencies, facing a fierce level of competition
among one another, were quick to give risky CMBS investments higher
grades.62 Thus, originators became less scrupulous regarding the health
of the underlying collateral, just as rating agencies became more likely
to overlook the signs of a risky investment in order to win more
business. These perverse incentives lead to a CMBS market rife with
misinformation between lenders and originators, resulting in dangerous
consequences for investors. When the CMBS market collapsed in 2007,
Congress and market-watchers took note of the rampant moral hazard
and focused their regulatory efforts on eliminating these issues.
D. DODD-FRANK AND CMBS
In response to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, lawmakers enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.63
The single largest piece of modern financial legislation targeted changes
in multiple areas of financial markets, which included numerous
provisions aimed at asset-backed securities (“ABS”).64 The Act
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission and other

59.
60.
61.

See id. at 104.
See id.
J. Zachary Monsma & Janet G. Price, A Property Market Framework for Bond
Investors, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 237,
240–41 (Frank J. Fabozzi & David P. Jacob eds., 1997).
62. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 52, at 108.
63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
64. DODD-FRANK: WHAT IT DOES AND WHY IT’S FLAWED 11, 103–04 (Hester
Peirce & James Broughel eds., 2012).
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agencies with broad rulemaking powers pursuant to regulating
markets.65
As a result of these agency delegations, numerous regulations that
affect CMBS have gone into effect over the last decade, including riskretention requirements for ABS sponsors, increased disclosure
requirements, the Volcker Rule, and enhanced capitalization
requirements for banks.66
Each of these changes will be discussed in detail in Part II.
In Part III, the paper will focus on how these regulations have bolstered
the CMBS market against systemic risk incident to the coronavirus.
PART II: REGULATION OF CMBS POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS
Following the challenges faced by the mortgage-backed securities
industry during the last recession, Congress and federal agencies enacted
several important laws and regulations that affected CMBS.
A. THE VOLCKER RULE
Perceived by some commentators as the most controversial legal
change in response to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis,67 Section 619 of the
Dodd-Frank Act (widely known as the “Volcker Rule,” or herein, “the
Rule”)68 prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading
and from sponsoring or investing in a hedge or private equity fund.69
Among the various policy justifications behind the Volcker Rule, the
65. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT 2 (2010).
66. See, e.g., Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014)
(codified at 12 C.F.R pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267);
SEC Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2014);
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)); John
Walter, U.S. Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes Since the Financial Crisis,
105 ECON. Q. 1, 2 (2019).
67. Ryan Bubb & Marcel Kahan, Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the
Volcker Rule, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2018).
68. The Rule inherits its name from its proponent, former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Paul Volcker. Jordan Schiff, The Volcker Rule in Practice: Its Impact,
Reception, and Evolving Profile, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 744, 745 (2020).
69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)).
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most salient is that banks, because of their importance to the stability of
the economy, should not trade on their own account, and should not
invest in funds on its own account, because of the risk of the bank’s
failure, or the bank’s failure or loss in liquidity by virtue of its exposure
to a failed fund.70
Proponents of the Volcker Rule point to the conflicts of interest that
existed before the Rule’s existence—banks exploiting client information
to make trades on their own account, or even selling financial products
to clients which were designed to fail.71 These banking abuses, however,
are not associated with the collapse of the economy in 2008, or with
systemic risk in general.72 For example, the Volcker Rule does not
prevent banks from originating, selling, or investing in subprime
mortgages—practices that are associated with the 2007–08 Financial
Crisis. Indeed, the efficacy of the Volcker Rule as a macroprudential
device has been in question since before its enactment.73
Though the Rule permits banks to engage in “market-making,”74
lawmakers and commentators at the time of the Rule’s enactment
recognized the challenge faced by regulators who would have to
distinguish between illegal proprietary trading and legal market-making
activity.75 In response to fear of running afoul of the Volcker Rule,

70. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats,
48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 515, 533 (2011).
71. Id. at 523.
72. See Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not
Central to Crisis, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/GCAEconomy20l0/idUSTRE62T56420100330 [https://perma.cc/A5FE-HW4V].
73. Letter from Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, United States House of
Representatives to Members of the United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Servs.
Oversight Council (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
74. Lee Meyerson & Keith Noreika, Finalized Changes to Volcker Rule, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/12/
finalized-changes-to-volcker-rule [https://perma.cc/M8PM-VCBJ].
75. See Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability, supra note 73,
at 1312 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the S. Banking, Hous. &
Urb. Affs. Comm.) (stating that an individual in the banking industry told him that he
“can find a way to say that virtually any trade we make is somehow related to serving
one of our clients. They can go ahead and impose the rule on Friday, and I can assure
you that by Monday we will find a way around it.”).
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commentators have posited that banks have contracted their marketmaking functions.76
According to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, one of
the largest lobbying firms in CMBS,77 the Rule has “hindered both
market making functions necessary to ensure a healthy level of market
liquidity and hedging necessary to mitigate risk.”78 In May 2018, the
Chairman of the Consumer Real Estate Finance Council stated that the
Council would work with regulators and members on changes to the
current compliance regime to restore liquidity in CMBS to a “level that
has been lacking post the enactment of the Volcker Rule.”79 In October
2019, a collection of federal agencies80 amended the Volcker Rule to
exclude privately offered credit funds from “covered funds” under the
Volcker Rule.81 The agencies acknowledged that the original rule
“‘inhibited’ the ability of banking entities to originate loans and extend
credit, in contravention of the intent of the Volcker Rule.”82
Whether the recent amendment to the Volcker Rule will increase
liquidity in the CMBS marketplace and stave off the commercial
mortgage crisis remains to be seen.83 As of May 2021, the delinquency
76. Simon Nixon, Why Liquidity-Starved Markets Fear the Worst, WALL ST. J.
(May 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-liquidity-starved-markets-fear-theworst-1432153849 [https://perma.cc/37A9-5ZZW] (“Banks have become so reluctant
to make markets that it has become hard to execute large trades even in the vast
foreign-exchange and government-bond markets without moving prices, raising fears
investors will take unexpectedly large losses when they try to sell.”).
77. Client Profile: Mortgage Bankers Ass’n of America, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2003&id
=D000000309 [https://perma.cc/UM3V-4BCT] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (illustrating
that the Mortgage Bankers Association employed 24 lobbyists in 2020).
78. Erika Morphy, The Volcker Rule’s Proposed Revision Could Add Liquidity to
CMBS, GLOBEST.COM (May 31, 2018, 7:31 AM), https://www.globest.com/2018/05/31/
the-volcker-rules-proposed-revision-could-add-liquidity-to-cmbs
[https://perma.cc/
QVW9-UHMX].
79. Id.
80. Volcker Rule 2.0: Some Helpful Upgrades and Bug Fixes—Update Your
Volcker Policies and Procedures Now, CLIFFORD CHANCE (Oct. 2019),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2019/10/volckerrule-2-0-some-helpful-upgrades-and-bug-fixes-update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y332GMZN].
81. SEC Covered Funds Activities and Investments, 17 C.F.R. § 255.10 (2014).
82. Id.
83. See Newly Adopted Volcker Rule Amendments Expand Opportunities for Banks
to Sponsor and Invest in Private Credit Funds, CLIFFORD CHANCE (July 2020),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2020/07/Newly-
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rate in the CMBS marketplace was 4.12%.84 If the amendment does
counteract the deterioration of CMBS then it is notable that deregulation
of the CMBS industry, and not increased regulation, has had a positive
effect.
B. REGULATION AB II
In 2014, the SEC deployed amendments to Regulation AB and
other disclosure-based regulations to require increased disclosure
regarding asset-backed security offerings, including commercial
mortgage-backed securities.85 These regulatory changes, collectively
termed “Regulation AB II,” were a response to “concerns about the
operation of [the SEC’s] rules in the securitization market.”86 In its
summary of the changes to the rules, the SEC remarked that “the
financial crisis highlighted that investors and other participants in the
securitization market did not have the necessary information and time to
be able to fully assess the risks underlying asset-backed securities and
did not value asset-backed securities properly or accurately.”87
Specifically, the SEC attributed “the failure[s] of credit ratings” and
“the collapse of ‘investment-grade rated securities’” to the economic
devastation wrought by the 2007–08 Financial Crisis.88 Thus, Regulation
AB II seeks to provide ABS investors with “improved pricing
accuracy,” unfiltered by credit rating agencies, in the form of mandated
asset-level data disclosures.89 For CMBS issuers, “[t]he asset-level data
required will, in general, include information about the credit quality of
the obligor, the collateral related to each asset, the cash flows related to
a particular asset, such as the terms, expected payment amounts, indices

Adopted-Volcker-Rule-Amendments-Expand-Opportunities-for-Banks-to-Sponsor-andInvest-in-Private-Credit-Funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6QZ-FK6G].
84. U.S. CMBS Delinquencies Tick Up in April for First Time since October 2020,
FITCH RATINGS (May 7, 2021), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structuredfinance/us-cmbs-delinquencies-tick-up-in-april-for-first-time-since-october-2020-0705-2021 [https://perma.cc/8Z5K-LW4P].
85. Charles A. Sweet, The SEC Finally Adopts Regulation AB II, 20 J.
STRUCTURED FIN. 22, 22 (2015).
86. SEC Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, 17 C.F.R. § 229
(2014).
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. at 41.
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and whether and how payment terms change over time and the
performance of each asset over the life of a security.”90
In addition to asset-level data disclosures, Regulation AB II
increased required disclosures from minority originators,91 required
issuers to provide prospectuses to investors five days before sale,92 and
mandated the appointment of an “assets representations reviewer.”93
Notably, Regulation AB II also requires that the Chief Executive
Officer in charge of the securitization certify that, inter alia, she has
reviewed, and is familiar with the pool assets, the structure of the
securitization, and all material transaction documents; that the
prospectus does not contain any untrue statements; and that the
prospectus and registration fairly present the risks of ownership of the
proposed ABS.94 The CEO certification requirement makes senior
officers liable under Section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act for
material misstatements or omissions.95 According to the SEC, prior to
Regulation AB II, it had “been difficult to hold senior officers of ABS
issuers accountable for the failure to provide accurate information.”96
Thus, Regulation AB II broadly focuses on correcting investor
over-reliance on credit agencies, on the pre-recession challenge of
punishing CEOs, and to regulate more parties involved in ABS
transactions. Despite the overhaul of ABS disclosures, a recent
ProPublica report suggests that rampant fraud and material
misstatements continue to plague the CMBS sector.97 Furthermore, it
remains unclear how increased disclosure requirements can reduce
systemic risk in CMBS.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 72.
See Sweet, supra note 86, at 24.
17 C.F.R. § 229.
Sweet, supra note 86, at 26.
17 C.F.R. § 229.
Id.
Id. at 332.
See Heather Vogell, Whistleblower: Wall Street Has Engaged in Widespread
Manipulation
of
Mortgage
Funds,
PROPUBLICA
(May
15,
2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/whistleblower-wall-street-has-engaged-inwidespread-manipulation-of-mortgage-funds [https://perma.cc/DU29-VS6J].
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C. CAPITALIZATION REQUIREMENTS
Every federally insured depository institution in the United States is
required by law to maintain adequate levels of capital.98 Without a
capitalization requirement, United States regulators believe banks would
tend to retain less capital and make riskier investments because they
know “governments and deposit insurers [will] end up holding the bag”
if their investments go sour.99
Following the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, Dodd-Frank enacted
changes to United States capital requirements, which affected the CMBS
market.100 Under the current scheme, banks that participate in
“plain vanilla banking activities” need only be “adequately capitalized,”
while banks that engage in CMBS trading need to be “well
capitalized.”101
Notably, risk-based capital requirements also apply to insurance
companies.102 At the end of 2019, $173.5 billion worth of life-insurance
CMBS holdings were included in risk-based capital computations.103
According to CMBS insiders, the risk-weighting of CMBS under
these regulations has negatively impacted private-label CMBS and made
CMBS more expensive under risk-based capital rules.104 During the
peak of the CMBS market in 2007, outstanding debt exceeded $800
billion.105 In March 2020, outstanding debt for the CMBS market had

98. See John Walter, U.S. Bank Capital Regulation: History and Changes Since the
Financial Crisis, 105 ECON. Q. 1, 2 (2019).
99. Id. at 1 (quoting Sheila Bair).
100. See generally Letter from Com. Real Est. Fin. Council et. al, to Hon. Janet
Yellen (Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter C.R.E. Letter] (on file with the National Multifamily
Housing Council), https://www.nmhc.org/uploadedFiles/Advocacy/CRE%20Assoc
iations%20B-IV%20Letter_120216%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKN3-DAUK].
101. Dodd-Frank: Minimum Capital Requirements, MOODY’S ANALYTICS (Mar. 1,
2011), https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2011/11-01-03-dodd-frankact-regulations-minimum-capital-requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/MES2-63CS].
102. Risk-Based Capital, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (June 24, 2020),
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_riskbased_capital.htm
[https://perma.cc/7SXV-2YCD].
103. Louie Woodall, U.S. Life Insurers Exposed to $130bn of CMBS, RISK
QUANTUM (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.risk.net/risk-quantum/7522206/us-life-insurersexposed-to-130bn-of-cmbs [https://perma.cc/JX44-XDVP].
104. See C.R.E. Letter, supra note 101.
105. Cristopher LaBianca et. al, Role of CMBS in the Financing of Commercial and
Multifamily Real Estate in America, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Oct. 2019),
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fallen to $490 billion.106 In comparison, outstanding RMBS debt reached
$2.2 trillion in 2007.107
Prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, however, favorable riskweighting of CMBS led to a higher demand and larger market for
private-label CMBS.108 Authors Stanton and Wallace suggest that
between 2002 and 2008, regulatorily mandated capital savings were
responsible for significant distortions in prices that institutional
investors were willing to pay for CMBS when compared to similarly
rated RMBS and corporate bonds.109 Furthermore, Opp, Opp, and Harris
argue that regulatory capital shifts prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis
reduced the incentive of rating agencies to acquire information about
underlying assets, leading to inaccurate bond ratings.110
These studies illustrate the influence that capital requirements had
over CMBS prior to the financial crisis. Though the size of the market
and the complexity of CMBS products have changed since the financial
crisis,111 the major players in CMBS have remained stable, with hedge
funds, capital management firms, and life insurance companies retaining
large portions of the sector.112 Given the stability and similar
sophistication of CMBS investors over time, alterations in capital
requirements may continue to influence buyer-choice in CMBS.
https://www.mba.org/Documents/CMBS%20White%20Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6NM-DKUZ].
106. Jennifer Johnson, Lodging Exposure in U.S. Insurer Commercial MortgageBacked Securities (CMBS) Investments, Year-End 2019, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS
(2019),
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/capital-markets-special-reportlodging-exposure-cmbs-investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY8Y-P2KA].
107. Part 1 of 2: Mortgage Loan and MBS Trends and Relative Instance Industry
Exposure—Residential,
NAT’L
ASS’N
INS.
COMM’RS
(2019),
https://www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/120809.htm
[https://perma.cc/22ALZE8J].
108. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation
and Regulatory-Capital Arbitrage, 2018 FIN. MGMT. 175, 177 (2018).
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id. at 176 (citing Christian C. Opp, Marcus M. Opp & Milton Harris, Rating
Agencies in the Face of Regulation, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 46, 46–47 (2013)).
111. See supra Part I.
112. See Institutional Holders of CMBS, HOLDINGS CHANNEL (last visited Mar. 31,
2021) https://www.holdingschannel.com/institutional/holders-of-cmbs [https://perma
.cc/32M4-GFEQ]; Hailey Ross & Jason Woleben, U.S. life insurers’ growing
commercial mortgage portfolios may face virus pressure, S&P GLOB. (April 2, 2021)
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/
us-life-insurers-growing-commercial-mortgage-portfolios-may-face-virus-pressure57760836 [https://perma.cc/7RX4-U95N].
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In the aftermath of the 2007–08 Financial Crisis, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) designated numerous institutions
as “systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”).113 Most of
these firms were banks, while three of these companies were insurance
companies: Prudential, AIG, and MetLife.114 During the course of the
Trump administration, regulators either removed these designations or
the companies successfully sued to have the designations removed.115
Regardless of their SIFI designation, commentators and lawmakers
alike recognize the importance of these institutions to the world
economy and may recall the controversial bailout of AIG during the
2007–08 Financial Crisis.116 With exposure to CMBS approximating
$130 billion in April 2020,117 regulators may be wise to deploy riskbased capital rules to forestall yet larger catastrophes due to CMBS
positions now and in the future.
D. RISK-RETENTION
According to Barney Frank, the architect behind Dodd-Frank, the
“single most important part of the bill”118 was the requirement that
regulatory agencies draft a rule mandating that the sponsor of
a securitization retain not less than 5% of the credit risk of any asset
conveyed to a third party.119 Prior to the 2007–08 Financial Crisis,

113. See Jim Zarroli, GE Capital Wants Off the List of Too-Big-To-Fail Institutions,
NPR (Mar. 31, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/03/31/472535899/ge-capital-wants-off-the-list-of-too-big-to-fail-institutions
[https://perma.cc/7WDG-GMGV]; see also John Heltman, Prudential, the last nonbank
SIFI, sheds the label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018, 9:08 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-last-nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label
[https://perma.cc/H8FS-W7Y3].
114. See Renae Merle, AIG Is No Longer “Too Big to Fail,’ Regulators Say, WASH.
POST (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2017/09/29/aig-is-no-longer-too-big-to-fail-regulators-say
[https://perma.cc/C6D2-V273].
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Woodall, supra note 104.
118. Floyd Norris, Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/business/mortgages-withoutrisk-at-least-for-the-banks.html [https://perma.cc/NS4F-X576].
119. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1891–92 (2010).
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lenders increasingly profited by originating loans and then off-loading
their risk by selling them into securitization pools.120 This process
increased bank liquidity and made credit more widely available, but
disincentivized banks to engage in adequate underwriting.121 This
“originate-to-distribute” model is associated with widespread
deterioration in asset-backed securities during the Financial Crisis.122
In 2014, then-SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar remarked that “risk
retention rules are intended to align the incentives of sponsors and ABS
investors by requiring sponsors to retain a financial interest and maintain
skin in the game.”123
Four years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, and two years after the
passage of the final rule, the 5% risk-retention requirement took effect in
late 2016 for new issuance of CMBS.124
Sponsors of CMBS may comply with the 5% risk-retention
requirement in one of three ways: by retaining an eligible horizontal
residual interest, an eligible vertical interest, or an “L-shaped” slice—
some combination equaling at least 5% of the fair market value of the
security.125
Retaining an eligible vertical interest translates into holding an
equal portion of each tranche of the security equaling 5% of the total
risk of the security.126 Sponsors may also retain a 5% horizontal share of
the most subordinated class of the security, the so-called B-Piece.127
Because of the first-loss nature of the B-Piece buyer, investors in this
position are considered more sophisticated, and hence, need not take on
additional interest in the security.128 The “L-shaped” interest may be
captured by combining some vertical or horizontal interests in the

120. See Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Skin in the Game: Aligning the Interests of Sponsors and Investors (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2014-spch102214laa
[https://perma.cc/
MVA5-CNC6].
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at
12 C.F.R pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267) (“Compliance
with the rule with regard to [CMBS] is required beginning December 24, 2016.”).
125. See id. at 77604, 77644.
126. See id. at 77607.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 77724.
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security, so long as they equate to no less than 5% of the aggregate risk
of the security.129
Initial responses from the CMBS market to the risk-retention rules
were grim: Some experts declared that the minimum 5% vertical interest
to be too expensive for most sponsors,130 while others insisted that the
opacity of the rules would slow the market to a crawl.131 Despite these
initial concerns, new issuance in CMBS has climbed in every year since
the Financial Crisis.132
In addition to failing to slow the issuance of CMBS, Sean J. Flynn
Jr. and his colleagues suggest that risk-retention rules serve to reduce
asymmetrical information between buyer and seller.133 In addition to
ensuring that sponsors retain some “skin in the game,” a driving force
behind risk-retention was addressing information asymmetry between
issuers and investors.134 This asymmetry, according to the SEC, gave
rise to the moral hazard of sponsors incurring risks when they knew they
would not be exposed to the losses.135
Under Flynn, Ghent & Tchistyi’s analysis, the choice of riskretention structure (i.e., horizontal residual interest, vertical interest,
etc.) influences bond pricing.136 The study reveals that bond issuers are
able to sell bonds for higher prices when the loan sponsor retains

129.
130.

See id. at 77607.
See Allison Bisbey, Why Risk Retention Rules May Give Big Banks the Edge in
CMBS, AM. BANKER (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/whyrisk-retention-rules-may-give-big-banks-the-edge-in-cmbs
[https://perma.cc/QEU4Y8VH].
131. Risk Retention Clarity Is Key to CMBS Future, SUMMER ST. ADVISORS (July
12, 2016),
https://summerstreetre.com/risk-retention-clarity-is-key-to-cmbs-future
[https://perma.cc/9XHF-9MY3].
132. Orest Mandzy, CMBS Issuance Hit $96.7B in 2019: Who Were the Most Active
Bookrunners?, TREPP (Jan. 8, 2020), https://info.trepp.com/trepptalk/cmbs-issuancehits-96-7-billion-in-2019-who-are-the-most-active-bookrunners
[https://perma.cc/E23G-FL2C].
133. Sean J. Flynn Jr. et al., Informational Efficiency in Securitization After DoddFrank, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 5131, 5132 (2020).
134. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77706.
135. Id. at 77705 (“The informational asymmetries in securitization markets
generated between the borrower and the investors in the asset-backed securities, who
are the ultimate providers of credit, give rise to the moral hazard problem of loan
originators or securitization sponsors incurring risks in the underwriting or
securitization process for which they did not bear the consequence.”).
136. See Flynn Jr. et al., supra note 134, at 5149–50.
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a horizontal residual structure of the most subordinated class. 137
In effect, issuers can signal to buyers that the collateral supporting the
security is of satisfactory quality by taking on the riskiest portion of the
transaction.138 If risk-based capital rules are the blunt swords that
massively influence the cost of capital in CMBS investments, riskretention rules are the fine blades that issuers deploy to signal to buyers
that the underlying transaction is a strong one.
PART III: DODD-FRANK’S LEGACY AND THE CORONAVIRUS
Despite the wide-sweeping nature of Dodd-Frank’s reforms, it has
failed to calibrate the CMBS market to withstand exogenous shocks,
such as those resulting from a pandemic. Despite a strong 2019, the
CMBS market deteriorated in the fall of 2020.139 Meanwhile, the CMBS
market is smaller140 and has fewer unique participants141 in 2020 than it
did in 2007. Dodd-Frank may be partly responsible for these
observations. Given the contraction of the CMBS market, and the fact
that the public and other banks are not retreating from CMBS
participants, the deterioration of CMBS may not pose a systemic risk to
the economy.
A. DODD-FRANK’S EFFECT ON MODERN CMBS
The current CMBS market is a fraction of the size of its peak in
2007.142 This may in part be the result of Dodd-Frank regulation.
The Dodd-Frank risk-retention requirement has made CMBS more
expensive to both borrowers and issuers. Since the implementation of
risk-retention, borrowers pay higher interest rates to obtain less

137.
138.
139.

See id. at 5153.
Id. at 5135–36.
Jake Mooney & Chris Hudgins, Coronavirus Jolts CMBS Pricing and 2020
Issuance Expectations, S&P GLOB. MKT. INTEL. (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/coronavirus-jolts-cmbs-pricing-and-2020-issuance-expectations-57965361
[https://perma.cc/6GU2-L89H].
140. See LABIANCA ET AL., supra note 106, at 10.
141. See DIANA KNYAZEVA ET AL., ISSUANCE ACTIVITY AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS
IN THE CMBS MARKET 37 (2016).
142. See CATHERINE LIU, TREPP, NEARLY $100 BILLION OF CMBS LOANS COME
DUE THROUGH 2020 1 (2019), https://info.trepp.com/hubfs/Maturities%20Due%20
Through%202020%20-%20January%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D6T-L93J].
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favorable loan terms while issuers retain more risk than they did before
risk retention.143 While this has the effect of making CMBS safer
to investors,144 the market has contracted since the implementation of
risk-retention rules.145
Additionally, investors now use risk-retention structure as a signal
for collateral quality.146 Where investors once evaluated the amount of
risk that an issuer retained for themselves a signal for collateral quality,
all issuers must now retain 5% of the credit risk.147 Since issuers do not
retain more than 5%, investors now look to an issuer’s choice of riskretention structure to determine the security’s quality. 148 At the present
moment, it is unclear whether retention-structure is a more efficient
signal than pre-Dodd-Frank volume-of-risk signaling.149 As a result,
risk-retention rules have made CMBS more expensive to issuers, and
possibly less efficient to investors.
As detailed in Part II, capitalization requirements have made the
CMBS market a challenging entry point for smaller banks who lack the
capital reserves to support significant CMBS holdings.150 In effect, the
participants in the CMBS market are increasingly large banks.151 In the
first quarter of 2020, the eight largest loan contributors to CMBS were
Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan
Chase, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America.152 These eight institutions all
fall within the top twenty largest banks by asset size in the United

143. Craig Furfine, The Impact of Risk Retention Regulation on the Underwriting of
Securitized Mortgages, 58 J. FIN. SERVS. RSCH. 91, 93 (2020).
144. Id.
145. See LIU, supra note 143, at 1.
146. SEAN J. FLYNN JR. ET AL., RISK RETENTION AND INFORMATION IN THE FACE OF
REGULATION 4–5 (2019).
147. Id. at 3, 6.
148. Id. at 3.
149. See Furfine, supra note 144, at 92, 100 (finding that commercial mortgages
securitized in deals after risk-retention rules went into effect were subject to higher
interest rates, lower loan-to-value ratios, and higher risk-debt-service ratios; thus,
CMBS has become more expensive to borrowers in the wake of risk retention).
150. See supra Part II.
151. Data Rankings Top CMBS Loan Contributor, COM. REAL EST. DIRECT,
https://crenews.com/data-rankings-top-cbms-loan-contributor [https://perma.cc/D2MSM7W8] (last visited Dec. 24, 2020).
152. Id.
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States.153 Their combined market share for all new issuance of CMBS in
Q1 2020 was just over 69%.154 This top-8 concentration among loan
contributors resembles the top-8 market share of loan contributors
before the 2007–08 Financial Crisis.155
Prior to the Great Recession, industry regulators warned that a high
concentration of commercial real estate holdings would make
institutions vulnerable to “cyclical commercial real estate markets.” 156
Additionally, with a high concentration among top loan contributors the
market is more vulnerable to shocks.157
Similarly, industry commentators allege that the Volcker Rule has
diminished the capacity of banks to function as market-makers, making
CMBS more challenging to trade.158 Though the Rule has a carve-out for
market-making, banks may be reticent to trade CMBS if they doubt
regulator’s capacity to distinguish between market-making and
illegitimate transactions.
This is not to suggest that Dodd-Frank has made CMBS a safer
market space for investors. Indeed, Dodd-Frank intended to eliminate
information asymmetry and align incentives between banks and
investors, but the predominant observation following the Dodd-Frank
reforms has been the decline of new issuance in CMBS.159

153. See Biggest U.S. Banks By Asset Size (2021), MX TECHS. INC. (Jun. 9, 2020),
https://www.mx.com/moneysummit/biggest-banks-by-asset-size-united-states
[https://perma.cc/2NTL-H7CD].
154. See id.
155. See KNYAZEVA ET AL., supra note 142, at 23–24.
156. Sam Chandan, The Past, Present, and Future of CMBS, WHARTON REAL EST.
REV. (Spring 2012) at *2, https://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2017/03/730.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WXF-BV2K].
157. Thorsten Beck, Olivier De Jonghe & Klass Mulier, Bank Sectoral
Concentration and Risk: Evidence from a Worldwide Sample of Banks, (July 18, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959273 [https://perma.cc/V62Y9QR4].
158. MBA Advocates Volcker Rule Changes to Improve CMBS Market Making,
MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N (Sept. 28, 2017), https://newslink.mba.org/cmfnewslinks/2017/september/mba-cmf-newslink-9-28-17/mba-advocates-volcker-rulechanges-to-improve-cmbs-market-making [https://perma.cc/6GCM-L7XG].
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B. THE CORONAVIRUS FALLOUT IN CMBS
Despite the recent downturn in the CMBS market due to
the coronavirus pandemic, the real economy is insulated from the
disturbances in the CMBS landscape. As discussed in Part I, market size
is a factor that economists commonly consider relevant in systemic risk
analysis.160
As discussed in Part II, total outstanding debt in the CMBS market
in March 2020 was $480 billion.161 At the peak of the CMBS market in
2007, there was $800 billion in total outstanding debt.162 Since the
2007–08 Financial Crisis and the implementation of Dodd-Frank, the
CMBS market has markedly contracted. The CMBS market is now
about half the size of the CMBS market before the last recession. 163
Some commentators are uncertain whether CMBS contributed to
systemic risk even at the height of dysfunction in the CMBS market in
2007.164 Since the market is now half its peak size, it follows that the
CMBS market poses even less systemic risk than its mid-2000s
predecessor.
Though the market remains concentrated at the top, with the same
major participants as 2007,165 Dodd-Frank has unwittingly neutralized
the market’s potential to pose systemic risk. Where Congress sought to
root out the moral hazard that it believed contributed to the 2007–08
Financial Crisis, the Dodd-Frank reforms instead succeeded in
minimizing the market’s potential to contribute to global economic
instability. However, instead of eliminating the behaviors it saw as riskmaking, the reforms only made those behaviors less profitable.166
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Risk retention rules made CMBS more expensive to smaller
investors and also made signaling less efficient.167 The Volcker Rule
made market-making more challenging for banks.168 Risk-based capital
rules made CMBS holdings more expensive for banks.169 These
measures, as narrowly intentioned as they might have been, resulted in
broad and sweeping effects. Dodd-Frank and the disasters of RMBS
halted all growth in CMBS. Therefore, even as Covid-19 shutters hotels,
businesses, and more commercial real estate across the United States,
the damage to CMBS is unlikely to cause yet greater damage to the
economy. The CMBS market is sufficiently insulated so that a massdelinquency event in CMBS, such as the United States experienced in
2020, will not trigger a global financial meltdown.
CONCLUSION
The deadly virus which has changed so many aspects of daily life
will not harm the world economy through any systemic risk posed by
CMBS. Though the virus has wreaked havoc and caused delinquencies
to reach near-unprecedented levels in CMBS, the Dodd-Frank reforms
have caused the CMBS market to contract to such an extent that further
CMBS deterioration will not pose systemic risk to the economy.
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